The Wasabi
Token

Emissions. Rewards are paid in USDC, not in WT. That needs a cash budget, not a token allocation. Supply is fixed and can only fall — redeeming against the floor burns the token redeemed.

A chip. You do not bet with WT. Bets settle in USDC and the major crypto currencies. Keeping the wagering currency separate from the reward currency is what stops revenue from being denominated in our own token — the loop that broke both losers above. The arithmetic is in the appendix.

Redeeming any fraction of supply removes exactly that fraction of the reserve. The ratio is unchanged — this is arithmetic, not a promise:

Where F is the reserve and C the circulating supply. There is no first-mover advantage and no bank run, because there is no fractional reserve: every token's claim is backed in full at the posted rate.

Every number there is provable. The pool publishes a signed epoch chain, per-account Merkle proofs of liabilities, and anchored tree heads — so you verify your own share against a signed record instead of believing our revenue figure. None of the three comparables offers this.

BT is a claim on a share of revenue. Before WT has a market that share buys nothing, so it settles as the dollars instead. Same share, same pool, same week, same twelve-month clock — you are never left holding BT with nothing to cash in.

The alternatives fail. Waiting for listing stores up a year of claims that then hit a market days old, and breaks the expiry rule. Paying from treasury invents a price no market has set. Settling in dollars costs the casino the same and works from the very first real bet.

1. Minted on house edge, on real-money bets only. Zero-edge games mint nothing. BT bets mint nothing.
2. Split pro rata, every week. The pool buys WT; everyone cashing in that week shares it in proportion. No account takes more than 5% of a week's pool, and anything over the cap is returned rather than forfeited — a capped week delays a claim, it never destroys one.
3. Every BT expires twelve months after it is minted — dated from each mint, so the amount in circulation can never exceed a year of minting.
4. BT tables stay. Losses burn, wins mint, a single win capped at 1% of everything outstanding. A BT win mints BT, not dollars, so the casino's exposure is exactly zero.
5. What BT buys sells back for BT, so the weekly pool stays the only route from BT to WT.
6. BT that is not earned on house edge is budgeted. Prizes and grants are capped together at a tenth of the previous week's earned BT.
7. Boosts decide who gets the pool, not how big it is. They divide a fixed pool rather than multiply a bill, so they cost the casino nothing.

Two guards travel with the mint: the edge used is the one actually charged on that round, and games where another player sets the return are excluded — otherwise the mint would follow a number your opponent chooses.

The supply curve is exact: it is the six allocation schedules added up, and it reproduces every published circulating-supply figure to the decimal. Revenue is the base-plan ramp, scaled by your month-24 input. Everything else is the formulas printed in sections 04, 05, 06 and 08, applied month by month.

It lands within about 3% of the full monthly model — same month-12 trough, same month-24 floor, same BT figures, a point or two low on late fair value. Use it to test how sensitive the case is to each assumption, not as a quote.

The direction worth noticing: higher staking participation supports a lower price, because the same pool of dollars is shared more widely. And raising the holder share has to come out of operations — the other four claims are fixed.

Every line of the split except one is payable in dollars: backers staked dollars and are owed dollars, holder payouts go out in USDC, the floor collects USDC, salaries are salaries. Only the buyback spends dollars to buy WT. So if players bet WT, the casino takes in WT but owes dollars — and the gap can only be closed by selling WT.

That selling is structural and price-insensitive. Nobody decides to do it — it is payroll. Holding the WT instead does not escape it: the dollar obligations then fall on a shrinking dollar share of revenue, reaching 100% of it at exactly 8.8%. Two branches of one identity.

Three more problems appear only when WT is the chip:

• A 100,000 WT maximum bet needs a 10,000,000 WT house float — 10% of supply frozen, competing with the airdrop.
• Lost WT piles up with the house. At 30% of revenue in WT, the edge wins back the entire 20% airdrop inside 24 months.
• The reserve would be held in the asset it insures. A price fall shrinks the reserve, that forces more selling, and the selling is the fall.

Four capital requirements, sized independently: an 18-month operating window funded regardless of revenue; a $300k launch top-up ring-fenced outside operating cash; $200k of protocol-owned exchange liquidity; and a $190k bankroll seed that is not an expense — it stays on the balance sheet as pool shares and sets initial player capacity at 2.33× itself.

Sell about 43% of supply — $1.5M at a $3.5M valuation. Below 35% the 18-month window is unfunded and the bear case ends the company. Above 45% the airdrop, team, treasury and liquidity cannot all fit.

The band is narrow because revenue sets the ceiling, not negotiation: at $4.0M the return test already fails. The only lever that widens it is cost — every $10k a month off the burn frees $180k of runway, worth 5.2% of supply.

The bankroll's return is a cost of capital, paid before holder payouts, the floor and the company. What it costs is set by the pool's distribution share, not by the pool's size — and fair value scales linearly with what is left for holders.

Every figure in this dossier uses the 0.20 row. A higher share moves money from token holders to bankroll backers one for one, and the valuation with it.

Three things get called dormancy; only one needs a rule. Dormant and unstaked is float nobody is selling — helpful, and no rule needed. Staked but inactive is already handled: payouts weight stake and play, so an inactive holder earns close to nothing and their share reverts to active ones — a 1.25× uplift at a 20% dormant rate.

Unclaimed payouts are the real gap. USDC that nobody ever claims would sit as a growing unowned liability — roughly $110k a year at month-24 volume. The rule: unclaimed for 12 months, it returns to the holder pool and is shared among active stakers. Stranded money becomes yield.